







This study examines the effects of public research and development (R&D) subsidies and the governance of such subsidies on firm productivity based on the analysis of a firm-level panel dataset between 1998 and 2007 in China. It is found that public R&D subsidies tend to support more productive firms and the productivity of these government-backed firms is improved further after they get the government support. Less attention is paid to the observable or measurable performance measurements in ex-ante project selection, and the ex-post effects are stronger when the governance of the public R&D subsidies becomes more decentralized due to an exogenous policy change. In other words, better decentralization of governance is associated with more pronounced effects of R&D subsidies. Identification concerns are addressed with various approaches to confirm the treatment effect of public R&D subsidies and the governance of such subsidies. 
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This study examines the effects of public research and development (R&D) subsidies and how the governance of such grants influences those effects. Corporate R&D activities may be underinvested in a free market because the social returns of R&D activities are larger than their private returns (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). Therefore, government engagement is called for as a mechanism to respond to such market failures (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1992). 
Empirical evidence on the effects of public R&D support is numerous while the results remain inconclusive. Some studies discover positive effects of public R&D support on firm performance and R&D intensity (Griliches and Regev, 1998; Branstetter and Sakakibara, 1998; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hsu et al, 2009; Ratinho and Henriques, 2010; Czarnitzki and Lopes- Bento, 2011; Doh and Kim, 2014; Radas et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2017). Meanwhile, such effects depend on the evaluation criteria of such programs (Hsu et al., 2009), the size or technology of the firm (Lööf and Hesmati, 2005; Clausen, 2009; Lee, 2011), or, the market conditions under which such programs operate (Sternberg, 2014; Guo et al., 2017). However, other studies find that public R&D support has done nothing to stimulate firm performance (Klette and Møen, 1999; Guan and Yam, 2015). Moreover, several studies find that public R&D support crowds out private R&D inputs, thereby reducing social welfare and growth (Wallsten, 2000; Hussinger, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2013; Hong et al., 2016).
Existing studies have significantly improved the understanding of public R&D programs. However, several knowledge gaps are left to be filled. First, although the role governments play in public R&D programs is well recognized, scholars have little understanding of how such programs are governed and how the governance influences the effects of such programs. To what extent the government may solve market failures relies on the capability and incentives of government agencies, which in turn are determined by the governance of such agencies. Therefore, the exploration of the governance of public R&D programs is essential for scholars to gain insights into the circumstances under which government engagement in corporate R&D activities may solve market failures. Second, existing studies mainly focus on public R&D programs in market-centered economies, where governments seldom intervene in markets and are assumed to be relatively efficient. Evidence on the effectiveness of public support for enterprise R&D is scarce where governments themselves are deeply engaged in business activities. Third, the endogeneity issue attributed to selection biases in public R&D programs has been a significant challenge and may contribute to the mixed findings in existing studies (David et al., 2000).
This study attempts to address the omission in the literature by examining the effects of public R&D subsidies in China and the governance of such grants. The Chinese government has recognized the importance of promoting corporate innovation and has invested substantial efforts in this endeavor (Sun et al., 2013). However, systematic analysis on public R&D subsidies in China is limited. Among the few studies on public support to corporate R&D in China, most are based on listed firms (e.g., Fan, 2006; Boeing, 2016; Boeing et al., 2016). Guo et al. (2016, 2017), Guan and Yam (2015), and Wang et al. (2017) are among the few studies that examine public R&D support to small-and-medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in China. However, these studies do not provide sufficient insights into the governance of such public programs or the consequent effects of the governance change. 
This study utilizes the data of the Innovation Fund for Small and Medium Technology-based Firms (Innofund) and the Above-Scale Industrial Firms Panel 1998–2007 (ASIFP) for the systematic examinations. It first determines whether public R&D subsidies select more productive firms, and, whether the productivity of firms is further enhanced after they get the public support than that of other firms and the same firms before winning the grants. Subsequently, this study investigates how the change of the governance of public R&D programs from a centralized to a relatively decentralized system owing to the exogenous policy change affects the efficacy of the two mechanisms mentioned before. 
The results of this study show that public R&D programs choose to support firms with high productivity and the productivity of these chosen firms is further improved after they acquire government support. Public R&D programs pay less attention to observable or measurable performance measurements in ex-ante project selection, and the ex-post effects are stronger when the governance of such programs is more decentralized. Finally, the better the decentralization is implemented by local governments, the stronger the effects of public R&D subsidies are observed. This study employs propensity score matching strategy and two-stage estimations with an instrumental variable to identify the ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies. Several other approaches, including quasi-difference-in-difference estimations, moving time-window cutoffs, and ruling out co-existing external shocks, are utilized to check the robustness of the effects of governance change of the public R&D program.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why public R&D subsidies are expected to have an impact on firm productivity in China and how the governance of public R&D support potentially influences the effects of such programs. Section 3 introduces the institutional background and the policy change of the Innofund program. Section 4 introduces the samples, data, and variables. Section 5 presents the empirical findings on the effects of public R&D subsidies and addresses the identification concerns. Section 6 reports the empirical findings on the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies and the robustness checks. Section 7 discusses the implications of the empirical findings to theory, policy-making and business practice. 
II. Public R&D subsidies, the governance of such programs and firm productivity   
2.1 Public R&D subsidies and firm productivity   
The effects of public R&D programs on firm productivity depend on several factors. First, the liquidity constraints of firms may affect the effects of public R&D programs. Investing in R&D activities can be a complicated decision-making process that involves various costs (Lucas, 1967). Firms need to calculate the costs and benefits of initiating adjustment and decide whether to take actions upon government support. If an awarded firm chooses to finance itself regardless of whether it gains public R&D support or not, government support may substitute the private R&D investment that exerts limited effects on R&D investments and firm productivity. However, if the awarded firm is financially constrained and chooses not to finance itself if there were no government support, the firm is expected to take actions with government support, and the effects of the public R&D program should be observed. 
Second, the effects of public R&D support may also be related to the incentives of firms to secure certification effects of the public funding. Empirical studies confirm that firms with public R&D support have increased access to other external finance in the market (Lerner, 2000; Meuleman and De Maeseneire, 2008). Direct financial support may not be the only reason a firm applies for public R&D support; instead, companies may maximize the certification effect of such program, which may help them gain other sources of external financial support. Administrative agencies periodically assess projects sponsored by public R&D subsidies. Failed evaluations send negative signals to potential external financiers. Therefore, firms have to prove their performance to secure the certification effect of public R&D support, specifically when financial constraints are strong, the financial market is not well-developed, and the credit system does not function well. 
Public R&D subsidies are expected to have significant effects on SMEs in China. Chinese SMEs have suffered from severe financial constraints due to profound information issues and the monopoly of state-owned banks in the banking industry (Gordon and Li, 2003; Allen et al., 2005). Firms, especially high-tech SMEs, are expected to value government grants and the certification effect of such grants. By the aforementioned theoretical reasoning and the context of China, following hypothesis is posited: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms backed by public R&D subsidies experience significantly stronger improvements in productivity after winning the grant compared to their non-government-backed counterparts and to themselves before the infusion of government grants in China.   
2.2 Governance of public R&D program and its effects
The primary rationale for the government intervention in corporate R&D activities is that firms may under-invest in R&D under a free market (Romer, 1986; Aghion and Howitt, 1990). Such reasoning suggests that incentives and capabilities of government agencies, which are mainly determined by the governance of such agencies, are crucial factors to determine the effects of public R&D program. Above all, the quality of project selection depends on the governance structure of organizations. Based on incentive theory, Sah and Stiglitz (1991) argue that decentralized decision-making system provides more incentives to local knowledge holders to exert more efforts in project selection. With the same evaluation costs, hierarchical organizations delay project selection, reject good projects and reduce the total number of project portfolios. By contrast, decentralized organizations accelerate the selection process and increase the number of selections by reducing communication costs and information issues though decentralized decision making may accept bad projects. Similarly, some scholars (Aghion and Tirole,1997; Dessein, 2002; Stein, 2002) argue that decentralized organizations induce a loss of control for the principal while reducing the agent’s incentive to miscommunicate information at the same time. Stein (2002) further proposes that decentralized organizations are more attractive when the information required is “softer,” whereas centralized organizations are more favorable when the information required can be “hardened” with less verification cost. Furthermore, Qian and Xu (1998) further argue that decentralized decision making may not only reduce ex-ante screening costs but also terminate bad projects ex-post on time because of the hardened budget constraints, such that both types of errors mentioned previously may be reduced. Such effects of decentralization should be evident in investment when the uncertainty is high, and the project quality is difficult to predict ex-ante. The theories mentioned above suggest that the selection of public R&D programs may be more efficient and rely less on observable or measurable performance indicators of firms if such programs are governed under a decentralized decision-making system than those are under centralized governance. We, therefore, posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Firm performance reflected by observable measures may be given less weight in project selection when the governance of public R&D programs becomes more decentralized. 
Furthermore, with a more decentralized decision-making system, the interests of local governments and the central government are more aligned. Therefore, local governments may have stronger incentives to ensure the quality of the awardees (Sah and Stiglitz, 1991; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Qian and Xu, 1998). Such incentives should serve as bases for recommending and selecting firms with severe financial constraints and growth potential which are more likely to be successful. With such efforts, it is expected to observe stronger ex-post effects of public R&D programs governed under a more decentralized system. Therefore, the following hypothesis is posited:
Hypothesis 3: The ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies are stronger after the governance of such programs becomes more decentralized than before.
Finally, China is large and heterogeneous in both institutional aspects and economic endowments that the implementation of the policies may vary across regions. As discussed by Xu (2011), under the regionally decentralized authoritarian (RDA) regime in China, the central government mainly controls through the political and personnel systems, whereas the governance of the local economy is delegated to local governments. Sub-national governments significantly influence local resource allocation and policy implementation from the central government driven by different incentives of the local governors. Such variations should be related to the implementation and the effects of the Innofund policy change in 2005. The following hypothesis is posited: 
Hypothesis 4: The more actively the local government implements the decentralization policy of the public R&D program, the stronger the effects of such program are. 
III.   Innofund program and its governance 
In the previous section, it is hypothesized that how public R&D subsidies and the governance of such subsidies may affect firm productivity based on theories and the context in China. Data from the Innofund program are used to empirically test the hypotheses posited in this study. Innofund is a public R&D program established upon the approval of the State Council in May 1999 with the aims to “facilitate and encourage the innovation activities of small-and-medium-sized technology-based enterprises (SMTEs) and the transformation of research achievements.” As the largest public R&D program supporting SMTEs in China, the Innofund program is sufficiently representative for addressing the questions of interests. Moreover, the Innofund program experienced a significant change in its governance in 2005 from a centralized to a relatively decentralized screening system. This exogenous policy shock may help us to capture the effects of the governance of public R&D program. In this section, the institutional background and the governance of the Innofund program are introduced. 
Various principal criteria regulate applications for Innofund. First, the projects should comply with the national industrial technology policies, show relatively high potential for economic and social benefits, and possess strong competitive capacity. Second, the applicant should be an SMTE with no more than 500 employees in total, among whom no less than 30% should have higher education. Third, the annual R&D investment of the firm should be at least more than 3% of its total sales. Fourth, firms should have a leverage ratio lower than 70%. Priority is given to projects with innovative technology or independent intellectual property, projects founded by overseas returnees or initiated jointly by firms and universities, and, projects using new technology to revive traditional industries and drive job creation.
Two levels of government agencies are involved in the administration of Innofund. At the central level, the Innofund Administration Center (IAC) under the Ministry of Science and Technology is responsible for Innofund administration including issuing application guidelines, proposing the preferred fields and industries for each year, screening and evaluating projects, conducting midterm supervision on individual projects, and closing contracts with firms. At the local level, each province has an Innofund office under the Provincial Science and Technology (S&T) Department, which reports to the IAC. 
The function of local Innofund offices was significantly changed in 2005 because of a policy announced in January of that year. The new policy substantially decentralized project screenings and evaluations, delegating power to local Innofund offices. Before 2005, the operation of Innofund was hierarchical and centralized. Local Innofund offices mainly served as a bridge between the IAC and local candidates by passing and interpreting IAC guidelines and policies to local candidates, collecting application materials on behalf of the IAC, and certifying qualifications of the candidates. A panel of experts at the IAC then evaluated the projects and promulgated the final funding decisions. Local Innofund offices neither had inputs in the final decision-making nor committed any resources to the recommended projects until the IAC had made its final decision. After the IAC made the decision, the Provincial Department of Finance was usually required to match 50% of the total support from the central government to the awardees.
In January of 2005, a new governance system was introduced. The system considerably increased the transparency of project screening and decentralized the decision making in project selection, evaluation, and monitoring thus shifted the roles of local Innofund offices. First, the local Innofund offices were required to take responsibility for the initial project selection. The local project assessments comprised 30% of the final decision of the IAC. Meanwhile, local Innofund offices were required to commit at least 50% of the proposed support (25% for some provinces in western China) to the locally selected projects before recommending such projects to the IAC. Local Innofund offices were also required to publicize the lists of recommended projects two weeks before submitting the projects to the IAC. 
The newly-introduced governance system brings out incentives to the local agencies to initiate creative operations in project selection at the local level. For example, Zhejiang province further delegates project recommendation to the lower city- or county-level governments. Chongqing and Hunan provinces co-operate with local institutions, such as local industrial and commercial bureaus, tax bureaus, law firms, accounting and auditing firms, to acquire firm information for decision-making. Moreover, most provinces start fostering Innofund recommendation agencies (IRAs) which help them perform due diligence. This effort is also reflected in the total amount of upfront matching funds committed by local Innofund offices. The total number of projects recommended by the local governments in 2005 was 4,207, and the amount of funding arranged by local governments was over 1.2 billion RMB during the application process, which was approximately six times of the amount local governments used to provide as matching funds annually before 2005.
After the decentralization of the Innofund governance in 2005, a noticeable increase in the success rate of Innofund applications is observed. As shown in Table 1, between 1999 and 2004, 25,190 firms applied for Innofund, putting in a request of RMB 25 billion. Comparatively, 20,179 firms applied for Innofund between 2005 and 2008, putting in a request of RMB 16 billion. Eventually, 6,410 firms (25.4% of the total applicants) and 8,174 firms (40.5% of the total applicants) were rewarded between 1999 and 2004 and between 2005 and 2008, respectively. To sum, the governance change of Innofund in 2005, as a quasi-experiment, provides a perfect opportunity to examine the effect of governance of public R&D programs.  Theoretically, decentralization offers more incentives to local governments. Meanwhile, anecdotes evident the changes in the operation of Innofund at the local level. Therefore, it is expected to observe differences in the effects of the public R&D program on firm productivity after the decentralization of the administration of such program. 
IV. Data, sample, and variables   
The data of this study are collected from two major sources. First, the information on Innofund awardees is obtained from the Innofund program website (http://www.innofund.gov.cn (​http:​/​​/​www.innofund.gov.cn​)). Since 1999, the names of Innofund-backed firms have been publicly announced on the website annually. Second, firm-level data on financial information and other firm-specific characteristics are derived from the ASIFP database, which consists of all state-owned and non-state-owned industrial firms with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB (US$750,000) from 1998 to 2007. 
The two datasets are matched to consolidate the information needed. In this study, data matching strategies used by NBER Patent Data Project are borrowed (for the specific details of the matching process, please refer Guo et al., 2016, 2017).  Eventually, 2638 awardee firms that won Innofund at least once between 1999 and 2007 are identified for the estimations. The final sample consists of 18,224 firm-year observations for Innofund-backed firms. A control group is subsequently constructed to compare the productivity and other performance measurements of Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed firms. The non-Innofund-backed firms (i.e., firms that were eligible for Innofund but did not apply or did not win in a given year) are identified from the ASIFP. A firm is eligible for an Innofund application if it has an industry code that is the same as the codes of the awarded group, has fewer than 500 employees, and has a leverage ratio lower than 70%. After the eligible Innofund candidates are determined, one-to-five matched pairs are randomly drawn from the eligible sample to formulate the control group controlling for location (provincial level) and the year of Innofund granting(same as the granting year for the matched Innofund-backed firms). Finally, 64,474 firm-year observations are obtained for 12,025 eligible firms. However, these firms are qualified but not supported by the Innofund program. 
The selection and the ex-post effects of the public R&D programs on firm productivity as well the effects of the governance of such programs are of the interest of this study. Productivity is measured by TFP, which is calculated by different methods to ensure that the conclusions are not driven by a specific measure. The first measure (TFP_ols) is a straightforward OLS residual from a log-linear transformation of the general Cobb–Douglas production function. The OLS production function estimates do not consider dynamics and may be biased once the unobservable shocks correlate with input levels. Hence, another set of TFP is calculated following Olley and Pakes (1996), who used investment as a proxy for the unobservable production shocks. TFP_op1 is the TFP calculated by following Olley and Pakes (1996) with time trends, whereas TFP_op2 is the TFP of the firm without time trends (Appendix A specifies the details on how TFP is calculated). 
To examine the project selection before and after the policy change, a set of performance measurements of firms is considered including the returns over total assets, returns over total equity, the count of newly granted patents and the sales from new products over total sales. Meanwhile, several firm-specific variables, including age, size, leverage ratio, and ownership structure are controlled. The variables used are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to eliminate outliers.
Table 2 presents the distribution of the sampled Innofund-backed firms. Panel A shows the industry distribution of these firms. Overall, 81% of the sampled Innofund-backed firms are in high-tech industries. The Innofund allocation is consistent with the goal of supporting corporate R&D activities. Panel B exhibits the annual distribution of the release of the Innofund grant to the firms for both the sampled awardee firms and the full sample of the Innofund awardees across 1999 and 2007. It shows that the sampled Innofund-backed firms have similar yearly distributions compared with those in the full sample, suggesting the representativeness of the sample in this aspect. 
Table 3 reports the summary statistics for the variables of interest. On the average, Innofund awardees outperform non-Innofund-backed ones in almost all performance measurements including TFP, returns over total assets, returns over total equity, the count of newly granted patents and the sales from new products over total sales. At the same time, Innofund-backed firms are larger and have lower leverage ratios across the examination period. It is worth to note that the maximum size (measured by the total number of employees) of both Innofund- and non-Innofund-backed firms are more than 500, exceeding the selection criteria of Innofund because the data presented comprises ten years of firm-year observations during which some firms have grown into much larger firms over time.
V. Empirical findings on the effects of public R&D subsidies
	In the subsequent subsections, two research questions are examined, which are whether public R&D programs select firms with higher productivity and whether government support subsequently enhances the productivity of the awardees. 
Logit regressions are conducted to determine whether Innofund chooses firms with higher productivity. The dependent variable is a dummy variable defining whether a firm is once backed by Innofund. Table 4 reports the results of the logit regressions. It shows that TFP measured by all approaches is significantly and positively associated with Innofund support, suggesting that firms with higher productivity are more likely to be supported by public R&D programs in China. An increase in the TFP_ols by 0.35 from its mean (approximately 100% of its mean) increases the likelihood a firm to be selected by  Innofund by 2%, and an increase in TFP_op1 by 2.63 from its mean (approximately 100% of its mean) increases the likelihood a firm to be selected by Innofund by 4%. Meanwhile, firm age and leverage ratio are significantly and negatively correlated with the Innofund selection, implying that Innofund tends to select younger firms and firms with lower leverage, consistent with the goals and project selection criteria of Innofund. 
To examine whether public R&D support affects the productivity of firms, fixed-effect panel data estimates are implemented through the following regression model: 

where indexes firms,  refers to time, and yit are dependent variables used to measure the productivity of firm at time . InnoAftit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t, and 0 if otherwise. A vector of control variables are indicated by , is used to control time-invariant firm-specific unobserved variables, and  is used to control for yearly fixed effects. The effects of Innofund on productivity are represented by . The preceding equation is estimated on the randomly matched sample. The monetary effect of the funding is also examined. With estimations on the total amount of support awarded, additional insights may be obtained into the extent to which government R&D funding eases the financial constraints of firms in China, where resource allocation is biased. The model is modified by replacing the dummy variable InnoAftit with InnoAmtit to estimate the monetary effect of the new funding. InnoAmtit is equal to the dollar amount of Innofund awarded if the firm has gained the support at time t and 0 if otherwise.
Table 5 presents the estimation results. Panels A and B report how the award of Innofund and the amount of Innofund grant affect firm productivity, respectively. Panel A shows that Innofund granting is significantly and positively associated with firm TFP measured by all the three approaches, suggesting that after winning the Innofund grant, the awardees have significantly higher productivity than non-Innofund-backed firms and the same firms before the funds were infused. For instance, Models (2) and (3) reveal that, after the infusion of Innofund, Innofund-backed firms have 9.4% and 7.8% higher TFP, measured respectively by OP approach with and without time trends, than non-Innofund-backed firms as well as the same firms before the funds were infused. The main findings remain when the public R&D support is measured by the total amount of the grant awarded as shown in Panel B. The regressions conducted in Panel B are further reiterated by replacing the absolute figure of the funding with the ratios of the funds over total profits and total free cash. However, no statistically significant relationship between these relative measures and firm productivity is observed (the results are provided by request).  
A significant and positive relationship between public R&D programs and firm productivity has been demonstrated. However, the causality is indeterminate because the positive correlation may be caused by other factors such as selection biases and omitted variables. 
First, the concerns of selection biases are addressed. The Innofund selection is not random as evident in Table 4. Thus, the positive association between firm productivity and public R&D support after the grant infusion observed in Table 5 may be caused by an ex-ante selection. To ease such concern, the propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is utilized to construct a control sample, through which the ex-ante selection effect can be controlled. In this study, the propensity score is the predicted probability of a firm winning an Innofund grant. Innofund-backed firms are matched with non-Innofund-backed ones on multiple dimensions including industry, location, size, innovation, financial performance and productivity，in the year before Innofund awarding to ensure that Innofund-backed and non-Innofund-backed firms are similar in various aspects at the time of Innofund infusion. Innovation output is measured by the count of newly granted patents and the ratio of sales from new products over total sales of a firm. Financial performance is measured by return on total assets (ROA). The productivity of Innofund-backed firms and their counterparts measured by TFP is also controlled. One-to-five nearest-neighbor matching is applied. Common support restrictions are also imposed during the matching, and the results are robust with or without such restrictions. The t-statistics of balancing tests indicate that the two groups of firms are similar in relevant aspects after the matching (results of balancing tests are available by request). 
Subsequently, Equation (1) is re-estimated based on this rigorously matched sample.  Table 6 displays the results. Panel A presents the comparison of means for the firms in the treated and control groups in the year before Innofund awarding, showing a successful matching procedure. The means of most control variables (except the ratio of sales from new products and firm TFP measured by OP without time trend controlled) after the propensity score matching are not significantly different between the two groups. Panel B reports the regression results based on the PSM sample. The results are similar to what is observed in Table 5. The economic magnitudes of Innofund on productivity decrease but remain statistically significant. Firms experience a 9.3% increase in TFP measured by OLS method after the award of Innofund. The estimates suggest that government-supported firms outperform non-government-supported firms in TFP after the potential ex-ante selection effects are controlled.
Second, the concerns with the omitted variables are addressed carefully, because a significant limitation of the PSM methodology is its inability to capture the effects of unobservable variables. Missing variables such as R&D capability or management capability of executives may co-exist with the government granting and contribute to the productivity improvements of government-subsidized firms. To address the concerns of unobservable variables, two-stage estimations using an instrumental variable (IV) are applied. The IV used in this study is the total investment in fixed assets over GDP made by local governments at county level annually (Fixassets). This IV is related to Innofund selection while exogenous from the productivity of the individual firms. Under the RDA regime in China, local governments, which manage local economic activities and allocate local resources, compete with each other for economic growth and seek for resources and supports from central government (Xu, 2011). Usually, the more ambitious the local government is, the more likely it makes investments in fixed assets. Therefore, local governments, which invest more in fixed assets, may be more likely to support local firms to compete for public R&D subsidies and make efforts to lobby upper-level governments for granting local firms. Therefore, firms located in counties where local governments invest more in fixed assets may have a higher probability of being selected by public R&D programs. However, the county-level investment made by the local governments should not be related to the unobserved factors affecting individual firm productivity. The information on local government investment from 1998 to 2007 is obtained from the city yearbooks. 
The empirical model consists of a selection and an outcome equation. Thus, a heterogeneous treatment model is utilized, which accounts for the selection of observables and unobservables, as well as for post-selection heterogeneity, to conduct the two-stage estimations (Heckman et al., 2006). The results of the estimates based on the random sample are reported in Table 7. Panel A of Table 7 presents the results from the first-stage estimates, which show that investment in fixed assets made by county-level governments is positively correlated with Innofund funding, confirming the relevance of the IV. The results of the second-stage estimations are presented in Panel B of Table 7. Models (1) to (3) show that firms experience higher TFP after they win Innofund grant compared with non-Innofund firms and the same firms before receiving Innofund support. The robustness of the two-state estimation results is further verified by repeating the procedure for the samples matched by PSM. The main conclusions remain valid after the potential ex-ante selection effect is controlled (estimations are provided by request). The above findings empirically confirm that winning public R&D support positively affects the productivity of firms even after controlling the endogenous nature of such support.
5.2 Additional robustness checks  
The examinations are carried on by using the largest public R&D program for SMTEs, the most representative and sophisticated firm-level panel database in China. However, several limitations with the data may cause biases to the estimations. Such concerns are addressed in this subsection.  
First, R&D expenditure is an essential variable that should be considered in examining the effects of public R&D programs. However, as introduced, the firm level panel does not provide information on R&D expenditure except for the years 2005 to 2007. Therefore, R&D expenditure or R&D stock cannot be controlled in constructing the sample for the whole period. Given that R&D expenditure is one of the most crucial factors that may affect productivity, annual R&D expenditure information is utilized as a criterion to match samples from 2005 to 2007 and check the robustness of the results. The results of the estimations are presented in Table 8. It shows that the findings presented in Tables 5-7 stay as robust when R&D expenditure is controlled in the matching. 
Second, some micro-sized firms in private sector are missed in the estimations because non-state-owned firms with annual sales less than 5 million RMB are not covered by the panel dataset. If government-subsidized firms happen to fall in this category disproportionally, the estimations may be biased. Such issue should not be a significant concern for this study. The panel dataset has a variable defining the size of firms showing that large-sized enterprises only compose 3.62% of the total sample while the majority (96.38%) of the firms covered by ASIFP 1998–2007 are SMEs. Hence, the estimations should not be significantly biased. To further ease such concern, the size of the firm measured by total sales is controlled in matching for both samples. Finally, firm size is also controlled in the regression estimations. The results are robust when firm size is measured by the total sales, the total number of employees and the value of total assets. 
Third, the information on the technology of firms is missing. Innofund targets at supporting technology-based firms. Merely controlling industries in matching may not ensure that firms in the control groups are technology-based ones which are eligible for Innofund application. According to the Innofund guides, to be identified as a “technology-based” firm is not a prerequisite for being a qualified applicant. Instead, Innofund imposes hard measures for firm size, industry, and R&D input as essential criteria for application qualification. Hence, as long as a firm falls in the industry selected by Innofund and satisfies the basic standard of being an applicant, it is eligible for applying for Innofund. Moreover, given that the estimations in this study are in a quasi-difference-in-difference manner, the selection biases have been controlled in this regard.  
 In summary, by using various approaches to identify the ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies, it is confirmed that public R&D subsidies exert significant and positive ex-post effects on firm productivity in China. Such findings are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1. 
VI. Empirical findings on the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies
6.1 The governance of public R&D subsidies and the ex-ante project selection 
In this subsection, how the governance of public R&D subsidies influences the ex-ante selection of such programs is revealed. To address such question, a dummy variable 2005_Aft is constructed, which equals 1 for the period between 2005 and 2007 and 0 if otherwise, to distinguish the pre-and-post governance change of Innofund. The end of 2004 is used as the cutoff to divide the two periods because the policy change of the Innofund program was announced in January of 2005 and implemented in June of the same year. 
The relationship between various observable firm performance variables and the selection of public R&D programs in general, and, the relationship between project selection and the interaction terms of 2005_Aft and such firm performance variables are tested. Aside from firm TFP measured by the three methods, some other firm performance variables are further added such as returns over total equity (ROE) and total assets (ROA), per capita value added(Value_add_per), the count of newly granted patents (Patent) and sales from new products over total sales (Newproduct_Rt), and,  the growth of total sales (Growth) in the year before the Innofund grant. The results of the logit estimations are presented in Table 9. 
As shown in Table 9, generally, all observable firm performance measures, including TFP, financial returns, labor productivity, and innovation outputs, are significantly and positively correlated with the Innofund selection, except for the sales growth of the firm. However, when the interaction terms are examined, it is found that that the coefficients of interaction terms between 2005_Aft and many observable performance variables such as financial performance, the number of newly granted patents and per capita value added, are all significantly negative. Such results suggest although all the observable performance measurements are crucial in Innofund selection in general, the selection of such program pays less emphasis to observable firm performance indicators when the governance of the Innofund program becomes more decentralized. These results are consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2. 
6.2 The governance of public R&D subsidies and its ex-post effects
To examine how the governance of public R&D subsidies affects the ex-post effects on firm productivity, a series of regressions are conducted to compare the productivity of firms backed by Innofund before and after 2005 and their non-Innofund-backed counterparts. The regression equation is as follows:

All control variables remain the same as those in Equation (1). The InnoAft dummy variable is replaced with two dummy variables to specify the Innofund-backed firms before and after 2005. Inno_2005Bfr is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t and if the Innofund was granted before 2005 and equals 0 if otherwise. Inno_2005Aft is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the firm has gained Innofund support at time t and if the first Innofund was granted after 2005, and 0 if otherwise.
Table 10 reports the regression results for the effects of the policy change in 2005. Models (1) to (3) show that the coefficients of variables indicating the Innofund infusion both before and after 2005 are significantly positive, consistent with the results shown in Table 5. Such findings imply that Innofund has significantly ex-post effects on firm productivity, no matter the firm wins the grant before or after 2005. Importantly, the coefficients of Inno_2005Bfr are significantly smaller than those of Inno_2005Aft in the three regression models, as shown by Lincom tests presented in Panel B. In general, the coefficients of Inno_2005Aft are roughly threefold of those of Inno_2005Bfr across the three models. Such findings support Hypothesis 3 which predicts that when the governance of public R&D programs becomes more decentralized, the effects of such programs are stronger.  
	Table 10 demonstrates the improvements of the ex-post effects of public R&D subsidies when the governance of such programs becomes more decentralized. However, it is difficult to claim that such results are driven by the decentralization of Innofund governance because the empirical practice is to instrument a time effect. To identify the policy change effects, the cross-regional variations in the implementation of the Innofund policy change in 2005 is used to conduct a set of quasi-difference-in-difference estimations. If the decentralization of Innofund governance since 2005 indeed helps to lift the effects of Innofund, it is expected to observe stronger Innofund effects in regions where the policy is implemented better.
Two aspects of the policy implementation are examined. First, the number of Innofund recommendation agencies (IRAs) is used as an indicator for the implementation of the policy change in 2005. After the Innofund policy change in 2005, local Innofund offices were encouraged to foster IRAs, which help to screen projects and conduct due diligence over the applicants. Second, the amount of matching funds committed by local governments to recommended projects since 2005 is taken as another indicator for the implementation of the policy change. Local governments did not have to commit any matching funds until the final decision was made before 2005. According to the newly-introduced policy in 2005, provinces should have committed at least 50% (or 25% for some provinces in western China) of the requested funds as local matching funds to firms they recommend before they submit the applications to the central Innofund committee. The two measures mentioned above are either encouraged or required by the central government associated with the decentralization of Innofund governance; they, therefore, serve as appropriate proxies for the implementation of the policy change. Moreover,  significant variations in the establishment of IRAs and the committed amount of matching funds are observed cross regions since 2005. 
To proceed the estimations, two variables are constructed.  First, IRA_per is the ratio of the total number of IRAs over the number of Innofund applications in a given province in 2005. Second, Matchingfunds is the ratio of total upfront matching funds provided by local governments over the amount of requested funding. A quasi-difference-in-difference approach is used to estimate the effects of Innofund policy change in 2005 using such newly constructed variables. The specification of the estimation is shown as follows: 

where all the other variables remain the same to those of regression Equation (1), and an interaction term of Inno_2005Aft and Policy (Policy represents the two policy implementation variables) is added.  
The results are presented in Table 11. As shown in this table, Innofund granting is significantly and positively correlated with firm TFP measured through any means, consistent with the results shown in Tables 5-7. More importantly, the coefficients of the interaction terms are significantly positive. Such results imply that the better the decentralization policy is implemented by the local government, the stronger the Innofund effects are observed. Taking Model (5) as an example, it is found that if a firm is awarded the grant, its TFP measured by OP method with time trend is about 0.04 higher than its counterpart and itself before the infusion of Innofund. Moreover, if the fund is awarded after 2005 and if the firm is located in a province with better implementation of the policy change, the increase of TFP is much higher. The results presented in Table 11 support Hypothesis 4, confirming that the effects of public R&D subsidies are stronger when the decentralization of such programs is implemented better. 
6.3 Additional robustness checks  
Besides the identification strategies mentioned above, additional robustness checks are conducted to ensure the robustness of the estimations. 
First of all, the potential effects of other external shocks around 2005 are considered. If the decentralization of Innofund in 2005 coincides with any other external shocks that affect the gap in firm productivity of firms in the treated and control groups before and after 2005, the results in Table 10 may be interpreted into something else rather than the effects of decentralization of Innofund governance. Two major external shocks around 2005 may be relevant, namely, the constitutional recognition of private property rights in 2004 and the opening of the Small and Medium Enterprise Board of Shenzhen Exchange (SME Board) in 2004. These two outside shocks may have implications for the external financing and investment activities of firms through which the productivity may be affected. To address these concerns, some additional estimations are conducted. First, if the constitutional change is the driving force for the TFP gap between Innofund awardees and non-Innofund-backed ones before and after 2005, one should expect to observe stronger effects on firms in the private sector than those of firms in the public sector. To identify whether the constitutional change in 2004 may violate the finding on the effects of Innofund policy change in 2005, the interaction term of the variable defining Innofund grant after 2005 and the state ownership of the firm into the estimations is added. The coefficients of newly-constructed interaction term are statistically insignificant. Such results imply that the recognition of private property rights in 2004 does not violate the findings on the effects of the decentralization of Innofund governance. Second, if firms winning Innofund after 2005 have a higher probability of being listed on the SME Board, the 2005 effect of Innofund in Table 10 may be partially driven by the opening of the SME Board. However, this is not a concern for this study. In total, there are only four IPO cases from the randomly drawn sample and the PSM sample, among which two are from the Innofund-backed group, and two are from the non-Innofund-backed group between 2005 and 2008. Given that the total number of Innofund-backed firms between 2005 and 2008 in the sample is larger than 1,100, the 0.2% Innofund-backed firms, which went to IPO on SME Board, should not statistically affect the gap between the TFP of the two groups. Hence, the opening of SME board in 2004 is not expected to violate the findings on the enlarged Innnofund effects after 2005 or reject the hypothesis on the positive effects of the decentralization of public R&D program governance.  
Additionally, the time window around the 2005 break is examined by moving the time window to t−1 and t+1 periods to determine whether 2005 is a unique turning point that is associated with significant improvements of Innofund effects. The estimations confirm that 2005 is the only turning point for the significant changes of Innofund effects (estimation results are provided by request). 
Another concern with the time window is related to the difference in the length of time for the examination periods before and after 2005. As the panel dataset is only available up to 2007, the samples for the estimations on before and after 2005 policy change are therefore imbalanced in the maturity of the Innofund infusion. If the short-term effects of Innofund are stronger than those in the long run, the stronger effects of Innofund after 2005 may be driven by the shorter length of examination periods for post-2005 awardees. To address this concern, two more dummy variables are constructed to define the range for the examination periods after winning Innofund backing (firms backed by Innofund within three years and firms supported by Innofund for more than three years) for pre-2005 awardees and their counterparts. Then the two newly-defined dummy variables are added, together with the dummy variable defining the Innofund grant after 2005, into the estimations for firm productivity. The results show that all the Innofund treatment measurements are significantly and positively associated with firm TFP, confirming the treatment effects of Innofund. More importantly, the coefficients of the variable defining the Innofund grant after 2005 are constantly and significantly larger than those of the two variables defining the awardees winning Innofund before 2005. Such robustness checks confirm that the 2005 effect is not driven by the length of the panel before and after 2005 (estimation results are provided by request).
Finally, this study also considers the normal cyclical productivity differences. First, the normal cyclical productivity in the process of TFP estimations is captured by adding both the year fixed effects and the sector fixed effects, and, deflating total output, capital and the intermediate inputs by price indices, respectively. Moreover, additional estimations as robustness checks are conducted by adding the annual per capita GDP at the provincial level and the interaction terms between the annual per capita GDP and Innofund grant before and after 2005 into the estimations as well.  The results of the effects of Innofund in general and the effects of the governance change of Innofund in 2005 remain robust (estimation results are provided by request). 
In summary, by using various identification strategies and robustness checks, the effects of the governance of public R&D subsidies are confirmed. Consistent with the prediction of Hypotheses 3 and 4, the effects of public R&D subsidies on firm productivity are stronger when the governance of such programs becomes more decentralized and when the decentralization is implemented better. 
VII. Discussion 
In this study, it is proposed that the heterogeneity in the effects of public R&D support discovered from the existing literature may be related to the variations in the governance of such programs and the institutions under which the public programs operate. Analyses on firm-level panel data of the Innofund program in China show that public R&D subsidies choose to support firms with higher productivity. Moreover, after winning the public subsidies, government-supported firms experience a significantly higher increase in productivity than other firms and the same firms before the grants are infused.  However, the ex-ante and ex-post effects of public subsidies vary depending on the governance of such programs. Observable performance measurements are less important in ex-ante project selection, and the ex-post effects of public subsidies are significantly stronger under a more decentralized governance system. This study has important implications to theory, policy-making and business practice. 
Implications to theory
The results of this study make three important contributions to existing literature. First, the findings on the effects of the governance of public R&D programs suggest a new perspective for further research on public R&D financing. Existing studies emphasize that the capability and incentives of government agencies involved in public R&D programs to choose ‘right projects’ are fundamentally essential to secure the success of the programs. However, there is little empirical evidence on how such programs are governed and how the governance influences the effects of the programs because of the lack of data. As discussed by Griliches and Regev (1998) and David et al. (2000), without the insights into the governance of the public R&D programs, it is hard to understand the mechanisms of such programs. The present study, therefore, fills the existing knowledge gap and has general implications for research on public R&D programs. Further research is needed to determine the interactions between the governance of the public R&D programs and the effects of various types of public R&D support from alternative aspects. 
Second, this study provides new support for the theories regarding the organizational structure and corporate innovation in the context of public financing. Discussions on the relationship between governance and innovation in corporate finance, both theoretically and empirically, are numerous. However, empirical analysis on such relationship in public financing is scarce though theorists have made various predictions on how the organizational structure of the government agencies is related to the innovation system of a state in general (e.g., Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995; Qian and Xu, 1998). Empirical analysis on such questions is essential academically because it sheds some light on the understanding of the differences and commonalities of the public and corporate governance of innovation by nature. The results reported in this study suggest that efforts may be focused on whether the relationship between the governance of public financing and firm performance and innovation is linear and the conditions under which the relationship may be shifted as discussed by the information theories. 
Third, this study adds new evidence on public R&D programs in transitional and emerging economies. Most existing studies are drawn from the data in market economies. Scholars have little knowledge regarding whether such government initiatives may have effects on corporate innovation in an economy where the market is yet to function well like China. Differing from the discoveries of several existing studies, which suggest that R&D subsidies fail to stimulate corporate R&D investment or innovation in China based on either industry-level data (Hong et al., 2016), or, data of large listed firms (Boeing, 2016) or small samples of SMTEs (Guan and Yam, 2015; Wang et al., 2017), this study reports positive effects of government R&D grants on firm productivity of SMTEs in China based on large sample panel data. The results of this study suggest that the effects of public R&D programs are heterogeneous depending on firm characteristics, market conditions and the governance of such programs, among others. More efforts are needed to address the heterogeneity of such programs in future research.  
Implications to policy-making 
This study also has important policy-making implications. The estimations suggest that public R&D support is essential for SMTEs, even in a market where the government has already deeply involved in business activities. However, the effects of public R&D support depend on how such programs are governed. A public R&D program will work more efficiently when such program provides appropriate incentives to government agencies. Central or federal governments, therefore, should decentralize the decision-making process and delegate power to local knowledge holders in project selection and monitoring. Furthermore, the examination implies that the advantage of decentralized governance is not only applied to public R&D programs but also applied to other public programs when information issues are profound.  
Implications to practice 




Table 1 Success rate of Innofund applications: 1999 to 2008













*Note: Some projects awarded in 2006 did not receive the funding from the Innofund program that year but in 2007. Hence, the success rate in 2006 was understated, whereas that in 2007 was overstated.

Table 2 Distribution of Innofund-backed Firms and Projects by Industry and Year 
Panel A: Industry Distribution of Sampled Innofund-backed firms (1999-2007)
Industry Description	SIC	No. observations 	 Percentage (%)





Electrical machinery and equipment	39	206	7.81
Communication equipment, computers, and other electronic equipment 	40	353	13.38
Measuring instruments and machinery for cultural activity and office work 	41	173	6.56
Others		470	17.81
Total		2,638	100
Panel B: Distribution of Innofund-backed Firms and Projects by year (1999-2007)
Year	Innofund-backed firms (sampled)	Innoufnd-backed projects (full sample)













Table 3 Summary statistics of related variables 








































	P-value	0.00 	0.00 	0.00 
Panel B	Marginal Effect	0.044***	0.016***	0.034***
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors; * = p<0.1; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01Table 5 Innofund award and TFP of firms  	






















Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors; * = p<0.1; ** = p<0.05; *** = p<0.01


Table 6 Innofund award and TFP of firms (PSM sample)Panel A: Comparison of Means across Matched Samples in Year t – 1Innofund-backed firms (Observation=  2492)Non-Innofund-backed firms (Observation= 12330)Difference TFP_OLS     0.4060.427-.021TFP_OP12.7262.728-.002TFP_OP22.5222.551-.029*Sales 64361.8763415.45946.42Patent Stock0.7780.6150.163ROA0.0820.0780.004Newproduct_Rt0.1900.0430.147***Panel B Treatment effect (PSM sample) (1)(2)(3)TFP_OLSTFP_OP1TFP_OP2InnoAft0.093***0.104***0.059***(0.019)(0.020)(0.019)Firm_age0.206***0.200***0.123***(0.020)(0.021)(0.020)State_Shr-0.112***-0.127***-0.161***(0.027)(0.028)(0.028)Lvg_rt-0.159***-0.132***-0.127***(0.024)(0.024)(0.025)Firm_size-0.051***-0.082***-0.089***(0.015)(0.015)(0.015)Constants0.441***2.985***2.208***(0.087)(0.089)(0.087)Year EffectYesYesYesFirm EffectYesYesYesN829168293982939adj. R-sq0.0360.0250.059








































Table 8 Innofund and firm productivity (subsample: R&D expenditure is controlled in PSM)  
Panel A: Comparison of Means across Matched Samples by PSM in Year t – 1 Innofund-backed firms (Observation=1103)Non-Innofund-backed firms (Observation= 5406)Difference TFP_OLS     0.2350.2110.024TFP_OP12.5992.5520.047TFP_OP22.6782.6440.034Sales62050.1966387.24-4337.05Patent Stock1.1321.392-0.26ROA0.0880.093-0.005Newproduct_Rt0.1860.1130.073***Ln(R&D expenditure)3.263.301-0.041Panel B Treatment effect (PSM sample) (1)(2)(3)TFP_OLSTFP_OP1TFP_OP2InnoAft0.059***0.060***0.033*(0.019)(0.020)(0.020)Firm_age0.170***0.184***0.083***(0.026)(0.026)(0.026)State_Shr-0.100***-0.134***-0.116***(0.035)(0.035)(0.035)Lvg_rt-0.186***-0.163***-0.134***(0.034)(0.035)(0.034)Firm_size-0.071***-0.116***-0.125***(0.017)(0.017)(0.017)Constants0.647***3.117***2.411***(0.099)(0.100)(0.098)Year EffectYesYesYesFirm EffectYesYesYesN436074361243612adj. R-sq0.0260.0220.072





Table 9 Innofund selection before and after 2005 










































Table 9 (continued) 
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Appendix A.  Estimation of firm TFP
TFP is accurately measured using three methods to ensure that the conclusions of this study are not driven by a specific TFP measure.

In the first method, the approach of Olley and Pakes (1996) in applied. Investment is used as a proxy for the unobservable production shocks. This semi-parametric method is applied to control for the simultaneity caused by unobserved productivity and the non-random sample selection induced by the different probabilities of exits for small and large low-productivity firms. The second measure is based on the Törnqvist index number. The TFP measurement in this methodology is more flexible because no unique regression model is built. The changing-weight indices of inputs and outputs are applied at the firm-specific level, and TFP is represented by the residual. Index theorist Diewert (1992) proves the efficiency of the Törnqvist TFP index through several statistical tests and refers to it as a superlative index. Moreover, this study addresses the transitivity problem of the TFP index by establishing a common standard for TFP comparison. The third measure is a straightforward OLS residual from a log-linear transformation of a general Cobb–Douglas production function. The OLS production function estimates may have a bias when unobservable shocks correlate with input levels. In addition, the OLS method lacks dynamic consideration.

OLS Method Explanation
The OLS method is straightforward. In the OLS regression, the TFP, which denotes the effects in the total output that are not caused by the tangible inputs in the production and represents the technological dynamism, is estimated as the error term.

The equation below demonstrates the estimation of TFP through the OLS method.


As the residual of the OLS regression, lnA is the TFP that is intended to measure. The firm-level TFP estimation is performed by considering the year and two-digit SIC code effects. The robustness of the estimation results are verified by relaxing the year effect to obtain the accurate estimation.

The disadvantage of the OLS method is that it only considers tangible inputs, such as labor and capital, and not unobservable shocks. This aspect results in a static model, in which all types of inputs are exogenous and have no correlation with the error term (i.e., TFP). The limitation of the OLS method is obvious, and the associated coefficients are biased.

OP Method Explanation
In the presence of selection bias and simultaneity, the OP estimation allows for the endogeneity of some of the input factors and unobserved productivity differences among firms. Such estimation also considers the exit of firms from the market. Hence, the OP estimation has several advantages over the simple OLS method.

The Olley and Pakes approach (1996) is characterized by the Bellman equation and assumes that the firm constantly maximizes the expected discounted value of future profits. Thus, stay-or-quit and investment decisions in each period are formulated.




where is deflated by the producer price index for manufactured products,  is the labor input by firm  at time  (either the number of employees or the total payment of employees of a firm can be a proxy for this variable), is the capital input by firm  at time  and is deflated by the price index of investment in fixed assets, denotes the intermediate inputs by firm  at time  and is deflated by the producer price index for purchasing products,is the productivity shock known by a firm when it makes its liquidation decision and investment decision, and is the true error term.

In this study, all variables in the equations are in their logarithm form, and the time trend and two-digit industry heteroskedasticity are controlled.

Index Method Explanation
The index method is regarded as a mainstream method in TFP estimation.
In this study, the case of N-input and M-output production process is initially considered. In such a case, Paasche, Laspeyres, or Fisher price index number formula results in different TFP estimations.

A Törnqvist index is followed to perform the log-form TFP estimation of this study. The index formula below explains the N–M case, comparing time  with time .

where is the  output revenue share in time , is the  input cost share in time , is the  output quantity in time , and  is the  input quantity in time .

This index measures TFP change in time t as compared with time s, allowing a binary comparison between the two time periods. When multilateral productivity comparisons are involved, the abovementioned formula is updated, and the transitive Törnqvist TFP index is used to ensure that the circularity test is passed.

Data source
The firm-level data of this study, together with associated financial information, are derived from the Above-scale Industrial Firm Panel (ASIFP). ASIFP is composed of virtually all the manufacturing firms in China with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB between 1996 and 2007. This database covers input information, such as labor, fixed asset, and intermediate inputs, as well as other firm-specific characteristics such as location, industry, and age. The database is an unbalanced panel data with gaps.





where  is real capital stock in t, is the efficiency of fixed asset in the th year, and is the fixed asset investment flow  years ago.





This study formulates fixed asset growth at the two-digit SIC code level as a recursive step back to the year when a firm was established. Applying the preceding PIM method, together with the series of investment deflators from China Urban Life and Price Yearbook (2009), this study constructs the series of real capital stocks. 1978 is set as the starting point of the initial capital stock for the series calculation, and 9% is applied as the fixed depreciation rate to be specific. All the nominal values are deflated by price indices with benchmark 100 set in 1996.

In the OP model, the decision-making process of a firm, that is, whether or not a firm opts to remain in the market, must be clarified. However, this information is not contained in the dataset used by this study. Accordingly, the panel data themselves are used to verify this exit variable. Using the unbalanced panel data with gaps ranging from 1996 to 2007, a firm is defined as exiting from the market when the observation record of the firm is not continuous. The dummy variable exit is equal to 1 if the firm exits from the market in the current period or 0 if otherwise.
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